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ABSTRACT 
The effects of fear appeals on attitudes, intentions, and behaviors were examined in a 
comprehensive meta-analysis. Studies were included if they contained a treatment group exposed 
to a fear appeal, a valid comparison group, a manipulation of depicted fear, a measure of 
attitudes, intentions, or behaviors concerning the targeted risk or recommended solution, and 
adequate statistics to calculate effect sizes. The meta-analysis included 127 papers (9% 
unpublished) yielding 248 independent samples (NTotal = 27,372) collected from diverse 
populations. Results showed a positive effect of fear appeals on attitudes, intentions, and 
behaviors, with the average effect on a composite index being fixed-effects ?̅? = 0.27. Moderation 
analyses based on prominent fear appeal theories showed that the effectiveness of fear appeals 
increased when the message depicted higher levels of fear, included efficacy statements, and 
depicted high susceptibility and severity. Messages were also more influential when the 
recommended behavior was one-time only, was self-esteem enhancing (hindering) and death was 
(was not) mentioned, and occurred at a delay when death was mentioned. Finally, fear appeals 
were more influential when the message’s audience was primarily female, from collectivist 
cultures, and young adult.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Fear appeals are persuasive messages that attempt to arouse fear by emphasizing the 
potential danger and harm that will befall individuals if they do not adopt the messages’ 
recommendations (Dillard, 1996; Maddux & Rogers, 1983). Although these messages are often 
used in political, public health, and advertising campaigns in the hopes of reducing risky 
attitudes, intentions, or behaviors, their use is often a polarizing issue. Whereas some 
practitioners are confident in the power of fear appeals to persuade audiences (e.g., CDC, 2014; 
Xu et al., 2014), others are adamant that such messages are counterproductive (e.g., Drug Free 
Action Alliance, 2013; Ruiter et al., 2014). The fear appeal literature reflects this disagreement, 
and empirical studies, literature reviews, and meta-analyses conducted over the past six decades 
have offered a diverse array of perspectives on the topic. Although some meta-analytic 
examinations have found positive effects of fear appeals on some outcomes (Witte & Allen, 
2000), others have found null effects (de Hoog et al., 2007) or even negative effects (Peters et al., 
2012). In the current paper, I present the results of a comprehensive meta-analysis of fear appeal 
research with two goals in mind. My first goal was to compile the largest available meta-analytic 
database of fear appeal research and estimate average effects. My second goal was to test a 
variety of theoretical predictions, many of which have never been examined meta-analytically, 
and to organize them within a framework that takes into account characteristics of a fear appeal’s 
message, recommended behavior, and audience. 
1.1 A Message-Behavior-Audience Framework of Fear Appeals 
 Existing theories about fear appeals have focused on either the content of the message, 
the nature of the behavior recommended by the communication, or the characteristics of the 
audience receiving the message. However, all three of these aspects (message, behavior, and 
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audience) are important and were considered in the framework that guided this review. This 
integrative framework gave the present meta-analysis a broader scope beyond past analyses of 
fear appeals. Specifically, each prior meta-analysis has only tested theories relevant to the 
message portion of the present framework, and thus was only able to address a limited set of 
questions pertaining to fear appeal effectiveness (for a description of prior meta-analyses, see 
Table 1) (Boster & Mongeau, 1984; de Hoog et al., 2007; Earl & Albarracin, 2007; Floyd et al., 
2000; Milne et al., 2000; Peters et al., 2012; Sutton, 1982; Witte & Allen, 2000). By adopting 
this more holistic view of fear appeals, it became possible to connect existing models that are 
generally treated as separate and to generate novel hypotheses about fear appeal effectiveness 
that have previously gone untested. Overall, this model is meant to be an organizing thread to 
help connect existing theories and research, and to identify areas in need of future research. This 
framework is useful for several reasons. First, each aspect (message, behavior, and audience) has 
the potential to vary independently of the others and may impact the communication’s 
effectiveness in ways scholars must consider. Second, this structure connects and organizes 
seemingly unrelated theories of fear appeals under a coherent framework. Third, and of 
particular importance, the MBA framework highlights that prior research has strongly focused on 
characteristics of fear appeal messages somewhat to the exclusion of the behaviors being 
addressed or the audiences being targeted (see Table 1). However, this bias is not due to a lack of 
interesting or important effects concerning the behavior or audience aspects of a fear appeal 
communication. Finally, in addition to introducing this framework, the current meta-analysis 
used a substantially larger meta-analytic database than prior analyses, thus providing more 
precision to test relevant hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONTENT OF FEAR APPEAL MESSAGES 
 Seven prominent theories make predictions about the impact of message characteristics 
on fear appeal effectiveness: The linear model of fear appeals (e.g., Witte & Allen, 2000), the 
curvilinear model of fear appeals (e.g., Hovland et al., 1953), the health belief model 
(Rosenstock, 1966; Becker, 1974; Becker et al., 1977; Becker et al., 1978; Rosenstock, 1974), 
the parallel process model (Leventhal, 1970), the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992; 
Witte, 1998), the stage model (de Hoog et al., 2007), and the elaboration likelihood model (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986). These theories concern the level of depicted fear within messages, the use 
(or omission) of efficacy statements within messages, the level of depicted susceptibility and/or 
severity within messages, and the vividness of a message’s information. 
2.1 Amount of depicted fear 
Perhaps the most central aspect of a fear appeal message is the amount of fear it is 
intended to arouse in message recipients. I will refer to this as depicted fear to emphasize that it 
reflects a property of the message’s content, rather than the subjective state of fear that message 
recipients experience.1 Two competing theories make predictions about amount of depicted fear, 
which I will refer to as the linear model (e.g., Witte & Allen, 2000) and the curvilinear model 
                                                 
1 The MBA framework addresses the relation between fear appeals and outcomes of interest 
(e.g., intentions) rather than the relation between fear and outcomes of interest. Although many 
fear appeal theories discuss fear, empirical studies typically test the impact of fear appeal 
messages on outcomes, and subsequently infer that message effects were mediated by 
experienced fear even though fear itself is rarely measured (for a discussion, see Popova, 2012, 
p.466). Indeed, only 71 of the 248 studies in the current meta-analysis measured fear directly, 
and such measures were typically treated as manipulation checks rather than independent 
variables or mediators. I will therefore discuss the influence of depicted message characteristics 
rather than subjectively experienced states (e.g., depicted fear versus experienced fear). This 
distinction applies to prior meta-analyses and primary studies as well, though the distinction is 
rarely made. 
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(Hovland et al., 1953; Janis, 1967; Janis & Feshbach, 1953; McGuire, 1968; McGuire, 1969). 
Both theoretical perspectives conceptualize depicted fear as a source of motivation, such that 
exposure to depicted fear increases motivation to adopt the message’s recommendations 
(Hovland et al., 1953; Witte & Allen, 2000). Further, both models predict that low levels of 
depicted fear will be relatively less motivating and thus less effective than moderate levels of 
fear. However, the linear model predicts that depicted fear has a positive and monotonic 
influences on attitudes, intentions, and behaviors, such that high depicted fear is more effective 
than moderate depicted fear (e.g., Witte & Allen, 2000). In contrast, the curvilinear model 
predicts that high depicted fear elicits defensive avoidance, a reaction in which message 
recipients disengage from the message, avoid further exposure to the message, and/or derogate 
the message because it is too frightening (Higbee, 1969; Hovland et al., 1953; Janis, 1967; 1968; 
Janis & Feshbach, 1953; Janis & Leventhal, 1968; McGuire, 1968; 1969; Millman, 1968). 
Consequently, the curvilinear theory predicts that high levels of depicted fear should be less 
effective than moderate levels of depicted fear. 
The linear and curvilinear models have been tested in prior meta-analyses, and the linear 
model has consistently been supported by existing data, whereas the curvilinear model has not 
(e.g., Witte & Allen, 2000). One drawback to prior investigations of the linear and curvilinear 
models is that the analyses included comparisons from studies that used two levels of depicted 
fear, even though it is difficult to equate levels of depicted fear across different studies – what 
may qualify as moderate depicted fear in one study may qualify as low depicted fear in a 
different study. Thus, an appropriate test of the linear and curvilinear models requires depicted 
fear to be manipulated with at least three levels within the same study to ensure that moderate 
depicted fear is operationalized as an intermediate level between extremes. I therefore tested the 
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linear and curvilinear models in the current meta-analysis by comparing the effects of high 
versus moderate depicted fear, using only studies that manipulated depicted fear across several 
levels. The linear model predicts that high depicted fear will be more effective than moderate 
depicted fear, whereas the curvilinear model predicts that high depicted fear will be less effective 
than moderate depicted fear. 
2.2 Efficacy statements 
According to the health belief model (HBM; Rosenstock, 1966; Becker, 1974; Becker et 
al., 1977; Becker et al., 1978; Rosenstock, 1974), the stage model (e.g., de Hoog et al., 2007), the 
parallel process model (PPM; Leventhal, 1970), and the extended parallel process model (EPPM; 
Witte, 1992; Witte, 1998), fear appeals “work only when accompanied by… efficacy messages” 
(Witte & Allen, 2000, p.606). An efficacy message is a statement that assures message recipients 
that they are capable of performing the fear appeal’s recommended actions (self-efficacy) and/or 
that performing the recommended actions will result in desirable consequences (response-
efficacy). The HBM, stage model, PPM, and EPPM suggest that when message recipients are 
presented with a threat (i.e., depicted fear), resulting feelings of vulnerability lead them to 
evaluate whether or not adopting the message’s recommendations will protect them from the 
threat-related negative consequences. If recipients decide that adopting the recommended 
action(s) will protect them, the fear appeal should be more effective. As efficacy statements 
provide this assurance, fear appeal messages that include statements about self- or response-
efficacy should be more effective than fear appeal messages that include neither (de Hoog et al., 
2007; Witte & Allen, 2000).  
There are two forms of the efficacy statement hypothesis. The strong hypothesis is that 
fear appeals without efficacy statements will produce negative effects (i.e., will backfire). The 
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weak hypothesis is that fear appeals without efficacy statements will produce weaker (i.e., less 
positive or null) effects relative to fear appeals with efficacy statements. Three meta-analyses 
have tested whether the inclusion of efficacy statements in fear appeals leads to increased 
effectiveness, and all found support for the weak hypothesis (de Hoog et al., 2007; Mongeau, 
1998; Witte & Allen, 2000). However, those studies were conducted using less comprehensive 
meta-analytic databases, and thus the current synthesis can provide a more thorough assessment 
of the strong and weak hypotheses. 
2.3 Depicted susceptibility and severity 
According to the stage model (de Hoog et al., 2007), the effectiveness of fear appeals 
should depend on their levels of depicted susceptibility and severity. A message high in depicted 
susceptibility emphasizes the message recipient’s personal risk for negative consequences (e.g., 
“One of fourteen women is destined to develop breast cancer during her life. So every woman 
may get breast cancer. You also run that risk!”; Siero et al., 1984), whereas a message low in 
depicted susceptibility does not personalize risk (e.g., “One of fourteen women is destined to 
develop breast cancer during her life.”; Siero et al., 1984). A message high in depicted severity 
describes the negative consequences of not taking action (e.g., “Breast cancer is a serious disease 
of which many women die, contrary to, for example, cancer of the uterus, where 90% to 95% 
recover.”; Siero et al., 1984), whereas a message low in depicted severity portrays manageable 
consequences (e.g., “If breast cancer is detected at an early stage it can be cured in a number of 
cases, contrary to, for example, lung cancer where 90% die of it.”; Siero et al., 1984). According 
to this model, high depicted severity (but not susceptibility) should improve attitudes, whereas 
high depicted susceptibility (but not severity) should improve intentions and behaviors. 
Consequently, only the combination of high-depicted susceptibility and severity should improve 
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attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. A previous meta-analysis found mixed results concerning 
these predictions (de Hoog et al., 2007). Specifically, messages with high depicted severity 
positively influenced attitudes, intentions, and behaviors, whereas messages with high depicted 
susceptibility positively influenced intentions and behaviors but not attitudes. I tested these 
hypotheses on the present more comprehensive database. 
2.4 Vividness of the message 
Vivid messages (defined here as colorful, graphic, or otherwise attention-grabbing visual 
stimuli) may facilitate information processing more than dull information (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; 
Sherer & Rogers, 1984) and can consequently be more persuasive (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
Evidence suggests that fear appeals become more persuasive as they become more graphically 
interesting and attention-grabbing for message recipients (Berkowitz & Cottingham, 1960; 
Robbins, 1962), and visual content (versus lengthy verbal messages) may also facilitate 
persuasion by being easier and less cognitively taxing to understand (McGuire, 1968). Many fear 
appeals lack vivid information and rely on verbal, informational, or statistical appeals (e.g., a 
pamphlet discussing a disease along with a few descriptive graphs; Brouwers & Sorrentino, 
1993). On the other hand, more vivid appeals may include graphic, attention-grabbing pictures or 
videos (e.g., a poster of two nude people embracing each other with the phrase “Use a condom” 
displayed at the bottom; Dahl et al., 2003). To examine whether fear appeals are more effective 
if they contain vivid information, I compared studies with fear inductions relying on vivid or 
evocative imagery relative to studies that induced fear verbally. 
Vividness may also interact with depicted susceptibility and severity to influence fear 
appeal effectiveness. According to the stage model, susceptibility should impact risk assessment 
via in-depth cognitive assessment, whereas severity should impact risk assessment via more 
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visceral emotional reactions (de Hoog et al., 2007). In persuasion contexts, logical arguments are 
often associated with in-depth thought, whereas visual stimuli are often associated with 
automatic emotional reactions (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo et al., 1986). Thus, there may be a 
congruency effect, such that fear appeals emphasizing severity information are particularly 
effective when conveyed with vivid/visual messages and fear appeals emphasizing susceptibility 
information are particularly effective when conveyed using less vivid/verbal messages. 
Therefore, in addition to testing for a main effect of message vividness, I also tested for an 
interaction of vividness with depicted susceptibility and severity. 
2.5 Comparison group message 
For exploratory purposes, I examined whether the type of message received by the 
comparison group moderated effect sizes. The three types of comparison messages in the present 
study are low depicted fear, neutral, and no message. Although I do not anticipate differences, it 
is possible that comparisons with low depicted fear will result in smaller effect sizes relative to 
the other two comparison groups because exposure to low depicted fear may result in persuasion 
in the same direction as the treatment group. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE RECOMMENDED BEHAVIOR 
 Five prominent theories make predictions about the impact of the recommended 
behaviors on fear appeal effectiveness: Robertson’s single action theory (Robertson, 1975; 
Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiler, & Salovey, 1999), prospect theory (Rothman et al., 1999; 
Rothman & Salovey, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) terror management theory (Goldenberg 
& Arndt, 2008; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999; Shehryar & Hunt, 2005; Solomon, 
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991), general action theory (Albarracin et al., 2011; Tannenbaum et 
al., 2011), and Colburn’s health relevance theory (Colburn, 1967). These theories concern 
whether the recommended behavior is a one-time or recurring activity, involves detection or 
prevention/promotion, occurs immediately or after a delay, can enhance self-esteem, is intended 
to replace a self-esteem enhancing behavior, involved action versus inaction, and involves health 
versus non-health behaviors. 
3.1 One-time versus repeated behaviors 
According to Robertson (1975; also see Rothman et al., 1999), persuasive messages 
should be more successful when they recommend one-time behaviors (e.g., getting vaccinated) 
compared to behaviors that must be repeated over an extended period of time (e.g., exercising). 
As it takes less effort to do something once than many times, people are likely to be more 
compliant when a single behavior is recommended. Using this principle, I compared the 
effectiveness of fear appeals recommending one-time versus repeated behaviors. 
3.2 Detection versus prevention/promotion behaviors 
According to prospect theory, negative outcomes can be categorized as incurring a loss or 
foregoing a gain, and losses tend to be more psychologically impactful than foregone gains of 
objectively equal magnitude (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Several researchers have extended 
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the logic of prospect theory to fear appeals, hypothesizing that fear appeals should be more 
effective when recommending detection behaviors relative to prevention/promotion behaviors 
(Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiler, & Salovey, 1999; Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Detection 
behaviors are enacted to obtain information about potential risk factors or existing health issues 
(e.g., being screened for cancer), and thus engaging in a detection behavior increases risk for 
incurring a loss (e.g., acquiring the unwanted and undesirable information that one has cancer). 
In contrast, prevention/promotion behaviors are enacted to obtain desirable outcomes (e.g., 
exercising to lose weight or avoid weight gain), and thus engaging in prevention/promotion 
behaviors does not increase risk for incurring a loss (e.g., exercising will only bring one closer to 
the desired outcome of losing weight or avoiding weight gain, so there is no potential for loss by 
engaging in exercise). Fear appeals are loss-framed messages because they emphasize negative 
consequences, and loss-framed information makes people more willing than usual to take risks 
(Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987; van’t Riet et al., 2014). Therefore, although fear appeals should 
be effective for both detection and prevention/promotion behaviors, they should be particularly 
effective for detection behaviors because the loss-framed nature of the message should make 
people more willing than usual to take on the risk of the detection behavior (Meyerowitz & 
Chaiken, 1987; Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiler, & Salovey, 1999; Rothman & Salovey, 
1997; van’t Riet et al., 2014). 
3.3 Mentioning death, self-esteem relevance, and time delays 
Many fear appeals explicitly mention death (89 of the 248 studies in the present meta-
analysis), and terror management theory (TMT) makes three predictions about this factor. 
According to TMT, when people are reminded of their mortality by being exposed to the concept 
of death, they often become motivated to buffer their self-esteem to reduce mortality related 
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anxiety (Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008; Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Shehryar & Hunt, 2005; Solomon 
et al., 1991). Some fear appeals recommend behaviors that can enhance self-esteem (e.g., dieting, 
which can improve body image; Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008), whereas others attempt to persuade 
people to stop engaging in behaviors that enhance self-esteem (e.g., tanning, which can also 
improve body image; Janssen et al., 2013). When fear appeals mention death, message recipients 
should increase commitment to behaviors that enhance self-esteem, regardless of whether the 
fear appeals encourage or discourage those behaviors. Consequently, fear appeals recommending 
self-esteem enhancing behaviors (e.g., dieting) should be more effective when they mention 
death than when they do not. In contrast, fear appeals recommending the cessation of behaviors 
that enhance self-esteem (e.g., tanning abstinence) should be less effective when they mention 
death than when they do not. 
TMT also posits that reminders of death activate two types of defensive responses: Short-
term proximal defenses and long-term distal defenses. Proximal defenses involve refuting 
information to avoid considering one’s death, whereas distal defenses involve buffering one’s 
self-esteem and pursuing long-term goals (e.g., a healthy lifestyle; Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). 
Consequently, fear appeals that mention death should be more effective if there is a delay 
between fear appeal exposure and occurrence of the outcome, rather than if outcomes occur 
immediately after exposure when proximal defenses are still active (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; 
Shehryar & Hunt, 2005).2 
3.4 Action versus inaction behaviors 
                                                 
2 TMT theories also predict a higher order interaction between mentions of death, time delays, 
and self-esteem, such that the predicted effects of self-esteem discussed above become stronger 
after a delay (Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). Of the 12 conditions represented by this prediction (2 
death x 3 delay x 2 self-esteem), four had zero observations in the present meta-analysis. Thus, I 
could only test the simpler predictions concerning self-esteem and time delay in isolation. 
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An important dimension along which behaviors vary is action versus inaction, with some 
behaviors requiring relatively high levels of motor or cognitive output (e.g., exercise) and others 
requiring low levels of output (e.g., dieting) (Albarracin et al., 2011; Hepler & Albarracin, 2013; 
Hepler, Albarracin, McCulloch, & Noguchi, 2012; Hepler, Wang, & Albarracin, 2012; Ireland et 
al., 2015; Tannenbaum et al., 2011). Although both actions and inactions can allow people to 
make progress toward a goal (e.g., pursuing weight loss via increased exercise or decreased food 
intake), it is possible that once people are motivated by fear, they will be particularly motivated 
to pursue actions because fear is an emotion associated with action tendencies (e.g., Frijda, 
1986). Therefore, I examined whether fear appeals were more effective when they recommended 
active behaviors relative to inactive behaviors. 
3.5 Health relevant behaviors 
According to Colburn (1967), fear appeals may be particularly effective when they target 
health behaviors because health behaviors are often perceived as more important and/or worthy 
of attention than non-health behaviors. Therefore, I compared the effectiveness of fear appeals 
that recommended health relevant behaviors (e.g., disease prevention behaviors; Brouwers & 
Sorrentino, 1993) versus those that recommended other behaviors (e.g., not voting for a 
particular politician because he will pass harmful legislation; Calantone & Warshaw, 1985). 
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CHAPTER 4: THE AUDIENCE 
 Four prominent theories make predictions about the impact of the audience on fear appeal 
effectiveness: Regulatory fit theory (Higgins, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2008; Kurman & Hui, 2011; 
Lockwood, Marshall, & Sadler, 2005), the transtheoretical model (Prochaska & DiClemente, 
1983; Prochaska et al., 1992; Prochaska & Velicer, 1997), Sears’ age and persuasion theory 
(Sears, 1983; Sears, 1986), and the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
These predictions concern whether the message’s audience is primarily female (versus male), 
from a collectivist culture (versus an individualistic culture), Asian or Hispanic/Latino(a) (versus 
African or European), already attempting to change risk behaviors (versus not), college-aged 
(versus younger or older), and highly educated (versus not). 
4.1 Culture, gender, and race 
According to regulatory focus theory, people can be prevention or promotion focused, 
placing greater value on either the avoidance of negative outcomes or the pursuit of positive 
outcomes, respectively (Higgins et al., 2008). Message frames that match the prevention versus 
promotion tendencies of the audience are more persuasive because they emphasize goal pursuit 
strategies preferred by the audience, and this regulatory fit increases attitudes toward the 
message, message engagement, and message elaboration, which are all factors that can increase 
persuasion (for a review of regulatory fit effects in persuasion, see Cesario, Higgins, & Scholar, 
2008). Importantly, fear appeals are definitionally prevention-framed messages because they 
emphasize what one should do to avoid negative outcomes, and prevention-focused populations 
should therefore be more persuaded by fear appeals relative to promotion-focused populations. 
Cultural research has found that members of collectivist cultures tend to be more 
prevention focused than members of individualist cultures (Kurman & Hui, 2011; Lockwood et 
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al., 2005). Cultures differ along a variety of dimensions including socialization practices and 
values (Greenfield et al., 2003; Schwartz, 2009), and thus members of certain cultures may be 
socialized to place more emphasis on either prevention or promotion focused behavioral 
strategies. Specifically, collectivist cultures socialize group members to be vigilant to avoid 
negative outcomes because such outcomes may reflect poorly on the group as a whole (Heine et 
al., 1999; Kitayama et al., 1997). As a result, members of collectivist cultures tend to adopt 
prevention focused strategies because these strategies allow them to directly pursue the goal of 
avoiding undesirable outcomes (Kurman & Hui, 2011; Lockwood et al., 2005). Importantly, 
prior research has identified differences in individualism-collectivism across a range of cultural 
groups, such that collectivism tends to be higher for women (versus men), Eastern cultures 
(versus Western cultures), and Asian and Hispanic/Latino(a) populations (versus African and 
European populations) (Hofstede, 1980; Kurman & Hui, 2011; Lockwood et al., 2005; Oyserman 
et al., 2002; Sampson et al., 2001; Triandis, 1995). As fear appeals are prevention-framed 
messages, they should therefore be particularly effective for audiences that are primarily female, 
Eastern, Asian, and Hispanic/Latino(a). 
4.2 Early versus late stages of change 
According to the transtheoretical model, people engaging in risky behaviors can be 
classified as belonging to an early stage (the model’s precontemplation, contemplation, and 
preparation stages) or a late stage (the model’s action and maintenance stages) in the change 
process  (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1983; Prochaska et al., 1992; Prochaska & Velicer, 1997). 
According to the early-effectiveness hypothesis, fear appeals should be more effective for 
individuals in the early (vs. late) stages because the former require motivational appeals to 
understand that a threat exists and to increase commitment to adopting desirable behaviors 
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and/or abandoning undesirable behaviors. In contrast, late stage individuals are already 
committed to behavior change and do not require such motivational appeals (DiClemente et al., 
1991; Nabi, Roskos-Ewoldsen & Dillman Carpenter, 2008; Prochaska & DiClemente, 1983; 
Prochaska, DiClemente, & Nocross, 1992; Prochaska, DiClemente, & Nocross, 2002). The late-
effectiveness hypothesis competes with the early one to predict that success at behavior change is 
associated with increases in self- and response efficacy (Cho & Salmon, 2006). As a result, 
exposure to a fear appeal should lead individuals who have already enacted change to process the 
fear appeal in the context of their high response efficacy (Cho & Salmon, 2006). Consequently, 
the late-effectiveness hypothesis predicts that fear appeals should be more effective for late stage 
relative to early stage individuals. To test the early-effectiveness and late-effectiveness 
hypotheses, I classified each study’s sample as belonging to one of the transtheoretical model’s 
first three stages or last two stages. I then compared the effectiveness of fear appeals for 
individuals in the early versus late stages. 
4.3 Age 
Young adults are particularly susceptible to persuasion relative to other age groups due to 
fluid social and political attitudes resulting from constant lifestyle changes that typically occur in 
early adulthood (Glenn, 1980; Sears, 1983; 1986; Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Jennings & Markus, 
1984). Specifically, college-aged (18-22 years old) adults are generally thought to be 
exceptionally persuadable because of their unique life circumstances that involve constant 
change and frequent exposure to novel ideas and environments (Sears, 1986; ten Hoor et al., 
2012). Therefore, fear appeals may be particularly effective for college-aged adults (18-22 years 
old) relative to adults (over 22 years old) or children/teens (under 18 years old). 
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Further, college-aged adults are often less likely than other age groups to realize that 
certain threats exist and to believe they should take precautions against such threats (e.g., 
automobile accidents; Tay et al., 2000). Thus, age differences in fear appeal effectiveness may be 
moderated by the stages of change. Specifically, college-aged adults in the early stages of change 
should be relatively unaware of threats compared to adults in the early stages and relatively less 
concerned by threats relative to children/teens in the early stages. In contrast, college-aged adults 
in the later stages of change (i.e., those who have already committed to changing their behavior) 
should already be aware of the relevant threats and concerned about them at a level comparable 
to other age groups. As fear appeals provide information about threats that college-aged adults in 
the early stages of change are unlikely to have considered, college-aged adults may be more 
persuaded by fear appeals relative to other age groups in the early stages of change but not the 
later stages of change when all groups have equal awareness and concern for threats. Therefore, I 
tested whether age had a main effect on fear appeal effectiveness, and also whether this effect 
was moderated by stages of change. 
4.4 Education 
Education is associated with the ability to accurately process information and follow 
instructions, and higher education has been associated with higher susceptibility to persuasion 
(e.g., Earl & Albarracin, 2007; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Sears, 1986). Therefore, I tested 
whether adults with higher levels of educational attainment were more persuaded by fear appeals 
relative to adults with lower levels of educational attainment. 
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CHAPTER 5: OVERVIEW 
 I compiled the largest meta-analytic database of fear appeals to date to examine the 
effectiveness of fear appeals for changing attitudes, intentions, and behaviors, and also to test 
moderator predictions made by a variety of influential fear appeal theories. Each of these 
theories tends to focus on one of three things – the content of the message, the type of behavior 
recommended by the communication, or the characteristics of the audience receiving the 
message (see Table 1 for a full list of theories and related hypotheses). Of the 27 fear appeal 
hypotheses discussed, only seven have been tested in prior meta-analyses, and all of them fall 
under the message aspect of the MBA framework (Table 1). Thus, the present research 
represents the first meta-analytic test for 20 of the 27 hypotheses and the first meta-analytic test 
for any hypotheses related to the behavior and audience aspects of the present framework. 
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CHAPTER 6: METHODS 
  
6.1 Review and Inclusion Criteria 
 
To locate studies, I conducted a search of the PsycInfo and Medline databases using the 
keywords (risk or fear or shock or severity or susceptibility) AND (persuasion or appeal or 
argument or tactic or campaign or communication or intervention). To supplement these 
database searches, I examined the reference lists of previous fear appeal meta-analyses, review 
articles, and chapters. I also contacted researchers to request unpublished data and sent requests 
to the e-mail lists of the Society of Behavioral Medicine, the Society for Personality and Social 
Psychology, the European Health Psychology Society, and the American Academy of Health 
Behavior. My search extended through February 2015 and yielded 430 potentially eligible 
articles, which were subsequently screened for inclusion in the current meta-analysis based on 
several inclusion criteria. For inclusion in this meta-analysis, studies had to meet the following 
eligibility criteria: 
1. Studies were included if they contained an experimental research design in which a 
treatment group was exposed to a message designed to induce fear (i.e., a fear appeal). 
2. Studies were included if they contained a comparison group. The comparison group 
could have been a group that was not exposed to any message, a group that was exposed 
to a message that was not designed to induce fear, or a message that was designed to 
induce less fear than the treatment group's message. When a study included more than 
two potential comparison groups, I opted to compare the highest depicted fear condition 
with the lowest depicted fear condition, prioritizing them in the following order: No 
message comparison group, neutral message comparison group, and low depicted fear 
comparison group. Thus, for a study containing a low depicted fear group and a neutral 
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message group, I used the neutral message group as the comparison group. Overall, all 
results should be interpreted as the effect of exposure to messages depicting more fear 
relative to less.3 
3. Studies were included if they experimentally manipulated depicted fear across groups. 
Studies were excluded if they used correlational research designs or provided all groups 
with the same level of depicted fear. 
4. Studies were included if they measured one or more of the following variables as an 
outcome in both the treatment and comparison groups: Attitudes, intentions, or behaviors. 
5. Studies were excluded if they did not contain appropriate statistics (e.g., F ratios, 
means and standard deviations, frequencies, or exact p values) for calculating an effect 
size representing the difference of outcomes for treatment versus comparison groups. If a 
study was otherwise eligible but did not contain appropriate statistics (e.g., it provided 
path coefficients from a structural equation analysis but did not supply means and 
standard deviations for treatment and comparison groups), I attempted to contact the 
study’s authors to retrieve usable data such as means and standard deviations. I contacted 
authors of 39 papers for this purpose: Three provided the requested data, six responded 
                                                 
3 A number of papers did not provide the full text of the messages that were presented to each 
group, which made it impossible to determine if comparison groups labeled with the terms 
neutral message or control message were actually presented with neutral messages or with low 
depicted fear messages. Thus, I could consistently compare relative levels of depicted fear across 
studies (more depicted fear vs. less depicted fear), but not absolute levels of fear (high depicted 
fear vs. low depicted fear vs. no depicted fear). Consequently, no message groups, neutral 
message groups, and low depicted fear groups were all considered appropriate comparison 
groups. Further, it was generally not possible to combine different potential comparison groups 
because information about standard deviations for the outcomes of each group was often lacking 
from reports, which made it unfeasible to calculate correct standard errors for combined 
comparison groups. 
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but could not provide the relevant data, and the rest did not respond to multiple contact 
requests. 
 
Of the 430 reports considered for inclusion in this meta-analysis, 127 met the inclusion 
criteria (9% unpublished), providing 248 statistically independent samples with a total N of 
27,372 participants in the treatment and comparison groups combined. Samples ranged in age 
from 9-87 years (M = 22.77 years, SD = 9.24 years) and were on average 66% female (SD = 
33%). An average of 81% of each sample had completed high school (SD = 37%). Further, 
samples were on average 71% White or European-American (SD = 34%), 14% Asian or Asian-
American (SD = 31%), 8% Black or African-American (SD = 18%), and 5% Hispanic/Latino(a) 
(SD = 14%). 
6.2 Coding of Outcomes (Effect Size Calculation) 
 I calculated a single effect size per sample that compared attitudes, intentions, and 
behaviors for the treatment group relative to the comparison group. First, for each sample I 
recorded all measures of attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. For each outcome, I calculated the 
standardized mean difference between treatment and comparison groups correcting for sample 
size bias (Johnson & Eagly, 2014, p. 686). Effect sizes (d) were calculated based on provided F-
ratios, t-tests, odds ratios, or means and standard deviations. To produce d for any odds ratios, I 
divided the log of the odds ratio by 1.81 (Haddock, Rindskopf, & Shadish, 1998; Hasselblad & 
Hedges, 1995). 
Note that outcomes could have concerned the negative behavior/issue targeted by the fear 
appeal (e.g., attitudes toward smoking) or the fear appeal’s recommendations (e.g., attitudes 
toward smoking cessation). Effect sizes were calculated such that higher positive values indicate 
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the treatment group scored higher in the message’s direction. For example, if a study used anti-
smoking messages, a positive d would indicate that the treatment group (relative to the 
comparison group) had more negative attitudes toward smoking or more positive attitudes 
toward smoking cessation. Thus, a positive effect size indicates the fear appeal worked, whereas 
a negative effect size indicates the fear appeal backfired. 
 The majority of samples (k = 170) included only one type of dependent measure 
(attitudes, intentions, or behaviors), but some samples included two types (k = 61) or all three (k 
= 17). Therefore, after calculating d for each outcome in a sample, I averaged all d values 
together to form a single effect size per sample that represents positive change in the direction 
advocated by the fear appeal. Further, if a sample included two or more measures of the same 
outcome type (e.g., attitudes toward smoking and attitudes toward smoking cessation), each was 
included in the average and weighted equally (the number of samples with multiple attitude, 
intention, and behavior measures was respectively k = 18, k = 24, and k = 12). This approach is 
justified on several grounds. First, for studies that included all three types of outcomes (attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviors), Cronbach’s alpha for the composite measure was .87, indicating that 
the three types of measures are highly internally consistent. Further, prior research has 
demonstrated that composite measures combining attitudes, intentions, and behaviors are a valid 
outcome of interest when investigating the relative persuasiveness of messages (O’Keefe, 2013). 
I therefore combined all attitude, intention, and behavior measures within each sample to form a 
single effect size per sample, which is how the results will be presented in the present 
manuscript. However, I also conducted all analyses separately for attitude, intention, and 
behavior measures; these results are presented in Appendix A and are consistent with the results 
based on the combined measure. Several hypotheses made specific predictions about attitudes, 
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intentions, or behaviors, and for those hypotheses (see Table 1), I present the relevant outcomes 
of interest in the body of the manuscript. 
Of note, attitudes were most commonly measured with semantic differential scales (e.g., 
positive/negative, beneficial/harmful, wise/foolish, etc.; Roskos-Ewoldsen, Yu, & Rhodes, 2004; 
Nabi, Roskos-Ewoldsen & Dillman Carpentier, 2008) and Likert style scales (e.g., agreement 
with statements such as, “I don’t like speeding”; Cauberghe et al, 2009, p. 280). Intentions were 
frequently measured with Likert style scales (e.g., agreement with statements such as, “In the 
immediate future, I plan to find someone who will teach me to do an accurate breast self-
examination”; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2004, p. 58) and questions with dichotomous response 
options (e.g., “In the future, I intend to stop spending time outside strictly for the purpose of 
getting a tan,” with responses Yes and No; McMath & Prentice-Dunn, 2005, p.629). Finally, 
behaviors were often measured dichotomously with self-report questions (e.g., “As a direct result 
of this message, did you seek help?” with responses Yes and No; Smalec & Klingle, 2000, p. 45) 
or behavioral observation data (e.g., information obtained from medical records; Ordoñana et al., 
2009). 
6.3 Coding of Potential Moderators 
 To test each hypothesis from the message, behavior, and audience portions of the MBA 
framework, I coded several relevant variables (moderator codes for each paper included in the 
meta-analysis are displayed in Table 2). The first author trained two independent coders, who 
then coded all study characteristics relevant to each report. Intercoder reliability was calculated 
on 20% of the overall database using Cohen’s kappa (κ) for categorical variables and Pearson’s r 
for continuous variables. Agreement for all variables was good: Categorical variables had 
average κ = .93 (SD = .06, minimum = .80), and continuous variables had average r = .92 (SD = 
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.12, minimum = .73). Disagreements were resolved by discussion and further examination of the 
studies. 
6.4 Moderators related to message content 
To test hypotheses concerning message content, I coded messages’ amount of depicted 
fear, inclusion (or absence) of efficacy statements, levels of depicted susceptibility, levels of 
depicted severity, inclusion (or absence) of vivid information, and the type of message used in 
the comparison group. 
 6.4.1 Amount of depicted fear. To test the linear and curvilinear hypotheses, I coded 
whether studies included a moderate depicted fear group. To qualify, studies had to contain at 
least three experimental groups that were exposed to different levels of depicted fear. Thus, a 
study containing a high depicted fear group, a moderate depicted fear group, and a low depicted 
fear group would be included, whereas a study containing a high depicted fear group, a low 
depicted fear group, and a neutral control group would not. As noted above, an appropriate test 
of the linear and curvilinear hypotheses requires a comparison between high and moderate 
depicted fear; thus, the moderate group must represent a level of depicted fear between high and 
low (rather than between high and none). In the entire database (k = 248), 21 samples included 
more than two experimental groups exposed to varying levels of depicted fear. To test the linear 
and curvilinear hypotheses, I calculated effect sizes (d) comparing outcomes for the highest 
versus middle depicted fear groups (the calculation of these effect sizes followed the same 
procedure detailed above for the calculation of treatment versus comparison effect sizes). The 
moderate depicted fear groups (total N = 1,626) were not included in other analyses (the studies 
and corresponding effect sizes included in this analysis can be found in Table 3) 
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 6.4.2 Efficacy statements. For each article, I dichotomously coded whether or not an 
efficacy message was embedded in the fear appeal. The efficacy message could have focused on 
self-efficacy (e.g., emphasizing that people have a built-in urge for physical activity and this 
basic human physical need will make it easy to begin a regular exercise program; Wurtele & 
Maddux, 1987), response-efficacy (e.g., emphasizing that exercise leads to higher levels of high-
density lipoprotein and thus prevents heart attacks; Wurtele & Maddux, 1987), or both (e.g., 
highlighting that condoms substantially reduce the risk of HIV transmission if used correctly and 
are easy to use consistently; Witte & Morrison, 1995). 
 6.4.3 Depicted susceptibility and severity. For each article, I coded whether depicted 
severity was manipulated to be higher in the treatment group relative to the comparison group 
(e.g., the treatment group received a message emphasizing the drastic consequences of not 
wearing bicycle helmets; Rodriguez, 1995) and whether depicted susceptibility was manipulated 
to be higher in the treatment group relative to the comparison group (e.g., the treatment group 
received a message focusing on how coffee consumption will likely lead the message recipient to 
develop fibromyalgia; Lieberman & Chaiken, 1992). 
 6.4.4 Vividness of the message. For each article, I dichotomously coded whether the 
message included vivid, evocative imagery (e.g., a poster of two nude people embracing each 
other with the phrase “Use a condom” displayed at the bottom; Dahl et al., 2003) or not (e.g., a 
pamphlet discussing a disease along with a few descriptive graphs; Brouwers & Sorrentino, 
1993). 
 6.4.5 Comparison group message. For each study, I coded whether the comparison 
group was presented with a low depicted fear message, a neutral message, or no message. 
6.5 Moderators related to behavior characteristics 
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To test hypotheses concerning the targeted behavior, I coded whether fear appeals 
recommended behaviors that were one-time versus recurring, detection versus 
prevention/promotion focused, action versus inaction focused, and health relevant versus not 
health relevant. I also coded whether death was mentioned when discussing the behavior, 
whether the behavior was measured immediately versus after a delay, and whether the 
recommended behaviors was self-esteem enhancing or self-esteem hindering. 
 6.5.1 One-time versus repeated behaviors. I coded whether the recommended 
behaviors concerned one-time-only instances (e.g., signing up for a stress management training; 
Das et al., 2003) or would need to be enacted over an extended period of time (e.g., regularly 
using child safety devices when traveling by car; Change et al., 1989). 
 6.5.2 Detection versus prevention/promotion. For each article, I coded if the 
recommended behavior was a detection behavior (e.g., getting tested for syphilis; Fukada 1975) 
or a prevention/promotion behavior (e.g., attending a training to prevent repetitive stress injury; 
Pengchit, 2010). I initially attempted to code prevention and promotion behaviors separately. 
However, due to the nature of these constructs, it was often difficult to discern how participants 
would construe a behavior (e.g., did participants conceptualize exercising as promoting a healthy 
BMI or preventing obesity?). As the relevant hypothesis solely concerned fear appeals being 
more effective when recommending detection (vs. prevention/promotion) behaviors, prevention 
and promotion behaviors were collapsed into a single code. 
 6.5.3 Mentioning death, self-esteem relevance, and time delays. I created a 
dichotomous code for whether or not the message explicitly used the word death. Messages 
dealing with behaviors or issues that could clearly lead to death were still coded as non-death if 
the word death was not explicitly mentioned within the message itself (e.g., messages about 
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smoking or HIV/AIDS that did not explicitly mention death as one of the potential 
consequences; Insko et al., 1965; McMath & Prentice-Dunn, 2005; Raleigh, 2002; Witte & 
Allen, 2000). This decision allowed for a more stringent test of TMT hypotheses, and provided 
an even distribution of death versus non-death conditions, which avoids the potential confound 
of death messages always being about more severe topics than non-death messages. 
 6.5.3.1 Self-esteem relevance. I coded whether the recommended behavior was self-
esteem hindering or self-esteem enhancing. Self-esteem hindering behaviors were intended to 
replace existing behaviors that allowed message recipients to derive self-esteem. Samples were 
coded as containing a self-esteem hindering behavior if the researchers specifically measured 
self-esteem for the existing behavior being targeted by the fear appeal and described the sample 
as high (e.g., high driving-related self-esteem; Taubman Ben-Ari et al., 2000), if the sample was 
designated as committed to the existing behavior (e.g., smokers that were highly committed to 
smoking; Priolo & Milhabet, 2008), or if the existing behavior is one that people typically 
engage in to improve self-esteem and/or physical attractiveness (e.g., tanning or bulimia; Janssen 
et al., 2013; Smalec & Klingle, 2000). 
In contrast, self-esteem enhancing behaviors have the potential to provide individuals 
with self-esteem. Samples were coded as containing a self-esteem enhancing behavior if the 
recommended behavior is commonly associated with the pursuit of improved self-esteem and/or 
physical attractiveness (e.g., fear appeals recommending a healthy diet to decrease BMI; 
Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). Samples were also coded as self-esteem enhancing when fear 
appeals targeted behaviors that the audience had clearly already made the choice to forego (e.g., 
antismoking ads directed at non-smokers; Insko et al., 1965) because message recipients should 
generally be able to derive self-esteem by continuing to avoid engaging in the discouraged 
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behavior (e.g., non-smokers who are told that smoking is bad and smoking abstinence is good 
should feel as though their decision to abstain from smoking reflects positively on them). Thus, 
studies were coded as self-esteem enhancing if the recommended behavior could improve self-
esteem via the pursuit of physical attractiveness (e.g., exercise; Wurtele & Maddux, 1987), if the 
addressed behavior was not relevant for the sample (e.g., anti-smoking ads for non-smokers; 
Insko et al., 1965; Smart & Fejer, 1974), if the sample was designated as not committed to the 
behavior in question (e.g., smokers that were not committed to smoking; Priolo & Milhabet, 
2008), or if the researchers specifically measured self-esteem related to the existing behavior 
being targeted by the fear appeal and described the sample as low (e.g., low driving-related self-
esteem; Taubman Ben-Ari et al., 2000). 
 6.5.3.2 Time delay. I coded the amount of time between the fear appeal and the 
measurement of the outcome variable using three discrete categories: (a) The measure occurred 
the same day as the fear appeal exposure (e.g., Taubman Ben-Ari et al., 2000; Cho & Salmon, 
2006; Nabi et al., 2008; Smart & Fejer, 1974; Stainback & Rogers, 1983); (b) the measure 
occurred one to fourteen days after fear appeal exposure (e.g., Berkowitz, 1998; Kirscht et al., 
1978; Muthusamy et al., 2009); and (c) the measure occurred more than fourteen days after fear 
appeal exposure (e.g., Bagley & low, 1992; Smith & Stutts, 2003; Witte & Morrison, 1995). I 
used categories because delayed outcomes often occurred within a specified range – e.g., 
participants returned to the lab during the following two weeks, but the exact number of days 
was not specified. 
 6.5.4 Action versus inaction behaviors. I coded whether the recommended behaviors 
were active responses that required message recipients to increase motor or cognitive output 
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(e.g., exercising, getting vaccinated) or inactive responses that required message recipients to 
decrease motor or cognitive output (e.g., dieting, smoking cessation). 
 6.5.5 Health relevant behaviors. I coded whether the recommended behaviors were 
health relevant (e.g., getting vaccinated, dieting) or not (e.g., buying insurance, voting for a 
particular politician). 
6.6 Moderators related to the audience 
To test hypotheses concerning the audience portion of the MBA framework, I coded the 
gender composition of the sample, whether the sample was from a collectivist or individualist 
country, the percent of each sample that was African, Asian, European, and Hispanic/Latino(a), 
the transtheoretical model stage of change that was applicable to the sample, the average age of 
the sample, and the educational attainment of the sample. 
 6.6.1 Gender composition. I coded the percent of the sample that was female. I also 
converted this percent to a categorical variable to provide multiple tests of this hypothesis. 
Specifically, I recorded if a sample was all-female or all-male (e.g., if participants were 
specifically being targeted for testicular or breast self-exams; Nabi et al., 2008), or if the sample 
contained 50% of each gender rounded to the nearest whole digit (e.g., Witte & Allen, 2000). 
 6.6.2 Collectivism and individualism. I dichotomously coded whether each study’s 
sample came from a primarily collectivist culture (e.g., East Asian cultures like South Korea, 
Japan, and Taiwan; Chu, 1966; Fukada, 1973; 1975; 1988; Kim et al., 2009) or a primarily 
individualist culture (e.g., Western cultures like Australia, Canada, and the United States; Beck, 
1984; Brouwers & Sorrentino, 1993; Dahl et al., 2003; Hill & Gardner, 1980; Jones & Owen, 
2006; LaTour & Tanner, 2003; Lewis et al., 2010; Smart & Fejer, 1974). 
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6.6.3 Race. For each sample, I coded the percent of the sample that was identified as 
being African, Asian, European, and Hispanic/Latino(a). These categories included Americans 
who identified as African American, Asian American, European American, and 
Hispanic/Latino(a) American. 
 6.6.4 Stage of change. I coded the transtheoretical model’s stage of change that was most 
applicable to the audience. As most studies did not specifically measure this variable, I designed 
a conservative coding scheme to ensure I could include the maximum number of reports in this 
analysis while avoiding misclassifications. The early-effectiveness and late-effectiveness 
hypotheses both make predictions that compare individuals in the first three stages of the model 
(precontemplation, contemplation, and preparation) versus the last two stages of the model 
(action and maintenance). Thus, I created a dichotomous code indicating whether the sample was 
in the early or late stages of the model. 
Samples were considered precontemplation if there was a clear indication that it was a 
sample merely at risk for a given behavior (e.g., participants who were designated as 
noncompliant with safe sex recommendations; Raleigh, 2002), or participants were being 
persuaded about a fictitious or not well-known disease/risk for which they had clearly not been 
engaging in protective action beforehand (e.g., hypoglycemia; de Hoog et al., 2008). I excluded 
samples in which the participants may have been in the precontemplation stage but for which 
there were no pretest measures available (e.g., if the sample was given a message about drinking 
and driving but there were no baseline measures available to indicate whether or not the sample 
had engaged in drunk driving in the past; Shehryar & Hunt, 2005). Samples were considered 
contemplation or preparation if there was a clear indication that they were already preparing to 
engage in the recommended action (e.g., a sample of women under 50 years old who had not yet 
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received mammograms, but the majority of whom stated they intended to receive mammograms 
after age 50; Jones & Owen, 2006). Samples were classified into the action/maintenance 
category if participants had explicitly been engaging in the recommended behavior (e.g., a 
message promoted breast self-exams and 80% of the sample indicated they already performed 
breast self-exams regularly; Siero, Kok, & Pruyn, 1984) or if they were recruited from a 
population that would definitionally be in this stage (e.g., patients receiving treatment in alcohol 
rehabilitation clinics; Brown, 1979). 
 6.6.5 Age. I coded the average age of each sample (M = 22.77 years; SD = 9.24 years) 
and categorized samples as children/teens (average age under 18 years), college-aged adults 
(average age 18-22 years), or adults (average age over 22 years). 
 6.6.6 Education. I coded the percent of each sample that had attained a high school 
degree or higher (M = 81%, SD = 37%). Many studies did not provide explicit educational 
attainment information, but in some cases it was clear that the sample had obtained high school 
degrees (e.g., samples of college students). In such cases, I estimated the percent of sample who 
completed high school as 100%. 
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CHAPTER 7: RESULTS 
 All analyses were conducted in R using the meta-analytic software package metafor, 
version 1.9.4 (Viechtbauer, 2010). I conducted all analyses using fixed- and random-effects 
analyses. As both types of analyses produced comparable results, I present the results of the 
fixed-effects analyses in the body of the manuscript and the results of the random-effects 
analyses in Appendix B. 
7.1 Distribution of Effect Sizes 
I first analyzed the distribution of effect sizes in the sample to determine whether there 
were biases in study retrieval and inclusion. Figure 1 displays a forest plot for the meta-analytic 
database, and Figure 2 displays the corresponding funnel plot. If no retrieval or inclusion bias is 
present in a meta-analytic database, the distribution of effect sizes in the funnel plot should be 
centered on and symmetric around the mean effect size, with smaller variability toward the top of 
the figure. If retrieval or inclusion biases are present, then the distribution should be asymmetric 
around the mean effect size. As can be seen in the figure, the distribution appears quite 
symmetric with smaller variability toward the top of the plot. I conducted a formal test of funnel 
plot asymmetry known as Begg and Mazumdar’s rank correlation test, which is a non-parametric 
correlation of the effect sizes with their corresponding standard errors (Begg & Mazumdar, 
1994). If this correlation is significantly different from zero, there is evidence of inclusion bias. 
The rank correlation was r = -.02, p = .67. Thus, there is no evidence of retrieval or inclusion 
bias. 
Another way of testing for biases is to use the normal quantile plot method (Wang & 
Bushman, 1999). In a normal quantile plot, the observed values of a variable are plotted against 
the expected values given normality. If the sample of effect sizes is from a normal distribution, 
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data points cluster around the diagonal; if the sample of effect sizes is biased by publication 
practices or eligibility criteria, data points deviate from the diagonal (Wang & Bushman, 1999). 
As can be seen from Figure 3, the effect sizes followed a straight line and generally fell within 
the 95% confidence interval of the normality line, and thus there is no evidence of retrieval or 
inclusion bias. 
7.2 Study Characteristics 
For descriptive purposes, I recorded the following for each sample: (a) Year of 
publication; (b) publication form (journal article, unpublished dissertation or thesis, or 
conference paper); (c) research setting; and (d) issue type/domain. The resulting descriptive 
statistics appear in Table 4. 
7.3 Average Effect Size and Between-Effects Variability 
 The average weighted effect size comparing outcomes for treatment to comparison 
groups was d = 0.27 with a 95% CI of [0.25, 0.30]. Therefore, fear appeals have a significant and 
positive effect on outcomes. That is, relative to participants in comparison groups, participants in 
treatment groups (i.e., those exposed to relatively high levels of depicted fear) had attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviors that were more in line with the position advocated by the fear appeal. 
There was also significant heterogeneity among effect sizes Q(247) = 1,287, p < .0001, 
suggesting that moderator analyses are appropriate. 
For studies that included a manipulation check of subjectively experienced fear, I coded 
this variable and calculated d for treatment versus comparison groups using the same methods 
employed for primary outcomes. I included all measures that asked respondents to report their 
current levels of fear (e.g., Cauberghe, De Pelsmacker, Janssens & Dens, 2009; Cho & Salmon, 
2006; Nabi, Roskos-Ewoldsen & Dillman Carpentier, 2008). Based on the 71 samples that 
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included such manipulation checks, fear appeals were generally successful at inducing 
experienced fear, such that treatment groups reported more fear than comparison groups, 
combined effect size d = 0.88 (95% CI: [0.83, 0.94]). 
7.4 Theoretical Tests 
 To test hypotheses of interest (see Table 1), I primarily conducted moderator analyses by 
calculating weighted effect sizes and corresponding 95% CIs for each level of the moderator 
variables (i.e., I meta-analyzed samples within each moderator level separately to produce an 
overall effect size estimate for that level). If the CIs for two moderator levels are not 
overlapping, then those levels of the moderator are significantly different from each other. In 
contrast, if the CIs are overlapping, then those levels of the moderator are not significantly 
different from each other. I also conducted moderated meta-regressions to analyze all moderator 
variables; those results were identical to the 95% CI analyses and are thus not presented here. 
Table 5 displays average weighted effect sizes and corresponding 95% CIs for all levels of the 
categorical moderator variables. 
7.5 Tests of message content hypotheses. 
 7.5.1 Message content: Depicted fear. To test the linear and curvilinear hypotheses, I 
calculated an average weighted effect size comparing groups that were exposed to moderate 
depicted fear versus high depicted fear (see Table 3). The linear hypothesis predicts that this 
effect size should be positive and significant, whereas the curvilinear hypothesis predicts that this 
effect size should be negative and significant. The combined effect size was d = 0.02 with a 95% 
CI of [-0.05, 0.09]. Therefore, outcomes did not differ for groups exposed to moderate versus 
high depicted fear. Instead of supporting either the linear or curvilinear hypothesis, this result 
suggests that depicted fear may have a maximum effective value, beyond which there is no 
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impact of depicting additional fear. This finding may have implications for practitioners using 
fear appeals - i.e., once a message depicts moderate fear, there is no value in depicting additional 
fear, but depicting additional fear will not lead to negative effects. 
One caveat is that this analysis was only based on 21 samples. However, this is the 
largest and most valid test of the linear and curvilinear hypotheses to date. Specifically, to ensure 
that the test concerned high depicted fear versus moderate depicted fear, I only included studies 
with at least three levels of depicted fear. Given that I obtained an overall positive effect of 
depicted fear when comparing treatment and comparison groups, the results here can be 
interpreted as supporting a modified version of the linear hypothesis. Specifically, depicted fear 
has significant positive effects, but depicted fear cannot be effectively manipulated indefinitely 
and results in diminishing returns beyond a certain point (rather than negative effects causing the 
message to backfire, as suggested by the curvilinear hypothesis). However, given the limited 
sample size, this conclusion should be confirmed in future research. 
7.5.2 Message content: Efficacy statements. The strong and weak efficacy hypotheses 
both predict that inclusion of efficacy statements in a fear appeal will lead to increased 
effectiveness. The results support this hypothesis: Fear appeals were more effective when they 
included efficacy statements (95% CI: [0.41, 0.49]) than when they did not (95% CI: [0.16, 
0.22]). However, the strong hypothesis predicts that fear appeals without efficacy messages will 
backfire and produce negative effects, whereas the weak hypothesis predicts that fear appeals 
without efficacy statements will simply produce less positive or null effects. The results clearly 
support the weak efficacy hypothesis and disconfirm the strong efficacy hypothesis. Thus, fear 
appeals are effective with or without efficacy statements, but the inclusion of efficacy statements 
is associated with increased effectiveness. These results confirm the conclusions of prior meta-
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analyses concerning the use of efficacy statements (de Hoog et al., 2007; Peters et al., 2012; 
Witte & Allen, 2000). 
As numerous theories and researchers have predicted that low efficacy combined with 
high depicted fear can be a dangerous combination that may backfire and lead message recipients 
to increase engagement in the harmful behaviors (e.g., Drug Free Action Alliance, 2013; Kok et 
al., 2014; Ruiter et al., 2014; Witte & Allen, 2000), I decided to explore this idea in more detail. 
Of the 154 studies with low depicted efficacy, only nine (5.8%) produced significant negative 
effect sizes. Further, of the 94 studies with high depicted efficacy, only 3 (3.2%) produced 
significant negative effect sizes. A two-way χ2 test comparing the frequency of significant 
negative effects to non-negative effects (non-significant and significantly positive effects 
combined) revealed there was no difference across the high and low efficacy groups, χ2(1) = .89, 
φ = -.06, p = .34. As one of the observed frequencies used in this analysis was below five (the 
number of significant negative effects for high efficacy messages), the validity of a χ2 analysis 
may be questionable. Thus, I also analyzed the data using a Fisher’s exact test, which confirmed 
that there was no significant relation between the number of significant negative effects and the 
presence of low versus high efficacy statements, p = .54. Therefore, there is no evidence that low 
efficacy statements are more likely to be associated with backfire effects than high efficacy 
statements. This supplemental analysis supports the conclusions of the initial “efficacy 
statement” moderator analysis, and together these analyses suggest that low efficacy statements 
categorically do not increase the likelihood of fear appeals backfiring. However, given the large 
amount of existing research interest in this idea, I identified several features that were present in 
all of the studies that contained low depicted efficacy and produced negative effects. All of these 
studies were conducted in individualist countries, focused on repeated behaviors (see below), 
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depicted high severity along with low susceptibility (see below), and targeted individuals in the 
later stages of change (see below). The domains of investigation varied widely, including 
messages targeting obesity, drunk driving, illegal downloading, dental hygiene, smoking, and 
internet addiction. Therefore, although I found no evidence whatsoever that low efficacy 
messages are associated with an increased likelihood of fear appeals backfiring, researchers 
interested in exploring this idea in future studies may wish to focus on the features identified 
above. 
7.5.3 Message content: Depicted susceptibility and severity. The first hypothesis 
concerning depicted susceptibility and severity states that fear appeals high in depicted severity 
(but not depicted susceptibility) will positively influence attitudes but will not influence 
intentions or behaviors. The 95% CIs indicated that fear appeals that were only high in depicted 
severity had positive effects for attitudes (95% CI: [0.15, 0.24]), intentions (95% CI: [0.25, 
0.34]), and behaviors (95% CI: [0.29, 0.38]) (see Appendix A for the results of all analyses done 
separately for attitudes, intentions, and behavior). Although this hypothesis was not supported, 
the results replicated a previous meta-analytic finding that high depicted severity influences all 
three outcome measures (de Hoog et al., 2007). The second hypothesis is that fear appeals high 
in depicted susceptibility (but not severity) will positively influence intentions and behaviors but 
will not influence attitudes. The 95% CIs indicated that fear appeals that were only high in 
depicted susceptibility had positive effects for attitudes (95% CI: [0.14, 0.53]), intentions (95% 
CI: [0.23, 0.52]), and behaviors (95% CI: [0.03, 0.84]). Therefore, this hypothesis was not 
supported. The third hypothesis is that fear appeals with high depicted severity and high depicted 
susceptibility will positively influence attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. The 95% CIs 
confirmed this prediction and indicated that fear appeals high on both moderators had positive 
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effects for attitudes (95% CI: [0.12, 0.28]), intentions (95% CI: [0.22, 0.33]), and behaviors 
(95% CI: [0.38, 0.53]). Further, the 95% CI for the focal outcome in the present meta-analysis 
(the average of attitude, intention, and behavior outcomes) also supported this result: [0.29, 
0.39]. Thus, fear appeals had positive effects on attitudes, intentions, and behaviors when they 
were high in depicted severity and/or susceptibility. 
7.5.4 Message content: Vividness of the message. Based on research demonstrating that 
vivid information can be more persuasive than plain information (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986; Sherer & Rogers, 1984), fear appeals containing vivid information may be more 
effective than non-vivid fear appeals. This hypothesis was not supported. Vivid fear appeals 
(95% CI: [0.27, 0.35]) and non-vivid fear appeals (95% CI: [0.26, 0.35]) were not differentially 
effective. To test whether message vividness interacted with depicted severity and susceptibility, 
I calculated confidence intervals for each combination of these variables. First, there were no 
vivid messages with low depicted severity and susceptibility, but there were non-vivid messages 
low in both (95% CI: [-0.28, 0.26]). Second, for messages high in depicted severity but low in 
depicted susceptibility, there was no difference between vivid messages (95% CI: [0.29, 0.39]) 
and non-vivid messages (95% CI: [0.20, 0.35]). Third, for messages high in depicted 
susceptibility but low in depicted severity, there were no differences between vivid messages 
(95% CI: [-0.27, 0.89]) and non-vivid messages (95% CI: [0.23, 0.52]). Finally, for messages 
high in both depicted susceptibility and severity, there was no difference between vivid messages 
(95% CI: [-0.10, 0.29]) and non-vivid messages (95% CI: [0.26, 0.38]). Therefore, there was no 
moderation when considering message vividness along with depicted severity and susceptibility. 
 7.5.5 Message content: Comparison group message. To explore whether the type of 
message received by the comparison group moderated effect sizes, I compared the average effect 
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size for studies with low depicted fear comparison groups (95% CI: [0.210, 0.291]), neutral 
message comparison groups (95% CI: [0.294, 0.378]), and no message comparison groups (95% 
CI: [0.182, 0.274]). Surprisingly, neutral comparison groups displayed larger effect sizes (at 
three decimal places) than both low depicted fear and no message comparison groups, though the 
latter two did not differ from each other. This was unanticipated and counter to expectations 
(e.g., that low depicted fear messages would result in weaker effect sizes relative to the other two 
conditions). However, it is possible that studies using neutral comparison groups also used 
relatively strong manipulations of depicted fear in the treatment condition, or that these studies 
systematically differed from other studies along some other dimension. Overall, there were no 
differences between studies using low depicted fear and no message comparison groups, but both 
produced smaller average effect sizes compared to studies using neutral comparison groups. 
7.6 Tests of the recommended behavior hypotheses. 
 7.6.1 Recommended behavior: One-time versus repeated behaviors. According to 
Robertson's (1975) single action theory, fear appeals that attempt to persuade people about one-
time behaviors (e.g., getting vaccinated) should be more effective than fear appeals that attempt 
to persuade people about repeated behaviors (e.g., exercising multiple times per week every 
week). The results supported this hypothesis, such that fear appeals recommending one-time 
behaviors (95% CI: [0.42, 0.52]) were more effective than fear appeals recommending repeated 
behaviors (95% CI: [0.18, 0.24]). However, it is worth noting that fear appeals were effective for 
both types of recommended behaviors, and they were simply more effective for one-time 
behaviors. 
 7.6.2 Recommended behavior: Detection versus prevention/promotion behaviors. 
Based on hypotheses derived from prospect theory, several researchers have hypothesized that 
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fear appeals should be more effective when recommending detection behaviors relative to 
prevention/promotion behaviors. The results did not support this hypothesis, as fear appeals 
recommending detection behaviors (95% CI: [0.27, 0.41]) and prevention/promotion behaviors 
(95% CI: [0.24, 0.29]) were equally effective. 
7.6.3 Recommended behavior: Death and self-esteem. Based on predictions from 
terror management theory, fear appeals that mention death (versus not) should be more effective 
when the recommended behavior is self-esteem enhancing but less effective when the 
recommended behavior is self-esteem hindering. The results supported these predictions. When 
fear appeals mentioned death and recommended a self-esteem hindering behavior, the fear 
appeals were ineffective (95% CI: [-0.16, 0.10]), and were moreover less effective than fear 
appeals that did not mention death and recommended a self-esteem hindering behavior (95% CI: 
[0.40, 0.76]). Further, when fear appeals mentioned death and recommended a self-esteem 
enhancing behavior, they were more effective (95% CI: [0.34, 0.61]) than fear appeals that did 
not mention death and recommended a self-esteem enhancing behavior (95% CI: [-0.02, 0.16]). 
Thus, both self-esteem hypotheses derived from terror management theory were supported: 
When fear appeals recommend self-esteem enhancing behaviors, they are more effective when 
they mention death, whereas when fear appeals recommend self-esteem hindering behaviors they 
are less effective when they mention death. 
7.6.4 Recommended behavior: Death and delay. A separate prediction derived from 
terror management theory is that fear appeals that mention death will be more effective if the 
recommended behavior is measured after a delay rather than immediately. These predictions 
were partially supported. When fear appeals mentioned death, they were more effective for 
outcomes that occurred between one and fourteen days after fear appeal exposure (95% CI: 
40 
[0.63, 0.91]) relative to outcomes that occurred the same day (95% CI: [0.14, 0.25]) or more than 
fourteen days later (95% CI: [0.20, 0.46]). The latter two time frames did not differ from each 
other. However, when fear appeals did not mention death, they were most effective for outcomes 
that occurred more than fourteen days later (95% CI: [0.33, 0.45]), second most effective for 
outcomes that occurred the same day (95% CI: [0.22, 0.29]), and ineffective for outcomes that 
occurred between one and fourteen days after fear appeal exposure (95% CI: [-0.11, 0.14]). 
Therefore, the death and delay hypothesis is mostly supported: Fear appeals that mention death 
are most effective after a short time delay of one to fourteen days (but not longer time delays), 
whereas fear appeals that do not mention death are effective for immediate outcomes, ineffective 
for medium-delay outcomes, and particularly effective for long-delay outcomes. 
Interestingly, the increased effectiveness of fear appeals at a time delay in both conditions 
suggests that sleeper effects may be common when using fear appeals. A sleeper effect occurs 
when message recipients initially reject a message’s recommendations but then come to accept 
the recommendations after a time delay (i.e., the message is not persuasive immediately, but it is 
persuasive after a delay; Kumkale & Albarracin, 2004). The occurrence of sleeper effects in 
response to fear appeals is sensible given that fear is an avoidance emotion (e.g., Frijda, 1986). 
That is, the fear induced by the message may cause message recipients to temporarily disengage 
from thinking about the message’s topic, but after the fear subsides, the information conveyed in 
the message may come to mind and influence attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. Although 
sleeper effects are typically investigated as a function of a message’s source credibility 
(Kumkale & Albarracin, 2004), these findings suggest that other factors such as the emotion 
depicted or induced by a message may also cause similar effects. 
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7.6.5 Recommended behavior: Action versus inaction behaviors. As fear appeals are 
thought to induce fear (an emotion associated with action tendencies), fear appeals may be more 
effective when they recommend active rather than inactive behaviors. However, fear appeals 
recommending actions (95% CI: [0.25, 0.31]) and inactions (95% CI: [0.25, 0.33]) did not differ 
from each other. 
 7.6.6 Recommended behavior: Health relevant behaviors. As health relevant 
messages may be spontaneously perceived as more important and self-relevant than other 
messages (Colburn, 1967), I compared messages recommending health behaviors (95% CI: 
[0.24, 0.29]) versus other behaviors (95% CI: [0.25, 0.37]). Based on overlapping confidence 
intervals, there is no evidence that fear appeals recommending health versus other behaviors 
differed in effectiveness. 
7.7 Tests of the audience hypotheses. 
7.7.1 Audience: Gender. Based on predictions derived from regulatory fit, fear appeals 
should be more effective for women than men. I tested this hypothesis in two ways. First, via 
meta-regression I regressed effect size onto the percent of the sample that was female, which 
produced a significant effect, b = 0.0025 (SE = 0.0006, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0013, 0.0037]), 
p < .0001. Second, I categorized samples as including all-female participants, all-male 
participants, or an even 50/50 mix (I only included samples that were exactly 50/50 when 
rounded to the nearest whole digit). Fear appeals had more positive effects for samples with all 
female participants (95% CI: [0.35, 0.47]) than all male participants (95% CI: [0.00, 0.27]), 
although neither single-gender group differed significantly from the 50/50 samples (95% CI: [-
0.13, 0.35]). Overall, the hypothesis was supported: Fear appeals are more effective for female 
message recipients than male message recipients. 
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7.7.2 Audience: Collectivism versus individualism. Based on predictions derived from 
regulatory fit theory, fear appeals should be more effective for collectivist samples than 
individualist samples. The results supported this hypothesis, such that fear appeals had more 
positive effects in studies conducted in collectivist countries (95% CI: [0.35, 0.49]) compared to 
individualist countries (95% CI: [0.23, 0.28]). However, it is worth noting that fear appeals were 
effective in both types of samples. 
7.7.3 Audience: Race. As African and European cultures tend to be more individualist, 
whereas Asian and Hispanic/Latino(a) cultures tend to be more collectivist (Sampson et al., 
2001), I tested whether fear appeals were less effective when samples included higher 
percentages of African and European participants but more effective when samples included 
higher percentages of Asian and Hispanic/Latino(a) participants. Not all studies reported 
information about race, and some studies collapsed race categories with few members into a 
single other category. Therefore, I initially conducted separate meta-regressions for each race 
category of interest. There was no relation between percent of the sample and fear appeal 
effectiveness when looking at percent African (b = -0.0003, SE = 0.0009, 95% CI for the slope: 
[-0.0015, 0.0021], p = .71), European (b = -0.0002, SE = 0.0005, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0012, 
0.0009], p = .78), Asian (b = 0.0003, SE = 0.0005, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0007, 0.0013], p = 
.53), or Hispanic/Latino(a) (b = 0.0008, SE = 0.0022, 95% CI: [-0.0036, 0.0052], p = .35). In a 
meta-regression predicting effect size simultaneously from all race categories, none of the race 
variables were significant, with the 95% CIs for the slopes being: African ([-0.0139, 0.0171]), 
European ([-.0125, 0.0178]), Asian ([-0.0122, 0.0179]), and Hispanic/Latino(a) ([-0.0122, 
0.0194]). Therefore, fear appeal effectiveness was unrelated to percent of the sample that was 
African, Asian, European, and Hispanic/Latino(a). 
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7.7.4 Audience: Stage of change. Based on the early-effectiveness hypothesis, fear 
appeals should be more effective for samples that occupy the first three stages of the stages of 
change model relative to the last two stages. In contrast, the late-effectiveness hypothesis 
predicts the opposite. Neither hypothesis was supported by the data because audiences in the 
early stages (95% CI: [0.27, 0.33]) and late stages (95% CI: [0.12, 0.28]) were not differentially 
impacted by fear appeals. 
7.7.5 Audience: Age. As college-aged adults (18-22 years) are generally more influenced 
by persuasion attempts than other age groups (Sears, 1986), I compared samples with a mean age 
under 18 years, between 18-22 years, and over 22 years. As predicted, fear appeals were 
significantly more effective for samples with a mean age of 18-22 years (95% CI: [0.31, 0.39]) 
compared to under 18 years (95% CI: [0.13, 0.24]) or over 22 years (95% CI: [0.20, 0.28]). Next, 
I tested whether age interacts with stages of change such that college-aged adults were more 
persuaded than other age groups in the early stages of change but not the later stages of change. 
For message recipients in the early stages of change, 18-22 year olds were indeed more 
persuaded (95% CI: [0.36, .46]) than adults over 22 years (95% CI: [0.20, 0.29]) or 
children/teens under 18 years (95% CI: [0.19, 0.33]). In contrast, for message recipients in the 
later stages of change, there was no evidence that 18-22 year olds were more or less persuaded 
(95% CI: [0.05, 0.39]) than adults over 22 years (95% CI: [0.20, 0.52]) or children/teens under 
18 years (95% CI: [0.02, 0.23]]. I also conducted these analyses as meta-regressions treating age 
as a continuous variable and including a quadratic age term to model the curvilinear effect. The 
results of the meta-regressions confirmed the results discussed here. Therefore, fear appeals were 
more effective for college-aged adults (18-22 years) relative to adults over 22 years or 
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children/teens under 18 years, and this effect held true for message recipients in the early stages 
of change but not the late stages of changes. 
 7.7.6 Audience: Education. To test whether education moderated fear appeal 
effectiveness, I conducted a meta-regression predicting effect size from percent of each sample 
that had completed at least high school, b = 0.0016 (SE = 0.0003, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0010, 
0.0023]), p < .001. The results supported the hypothesis that higher levels of education are 
associated with increased fear appeal effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Fear appeals are effective. The present meta-analysis found that fear appeals were 
successful at influencing attitudes, intentions, and behaviors across nearly all conditions that 
were analyzed. Even when a moderator was unrelated to fear appeal effectiveness, fear appeals 
were still more effective than comparison treatments. Further, there was not one level of any 
moderator that I tested for which fear appeals backfired to produce worse outcomes relative to 
the comparison groups. These results are striking given the wide range of theories that attempt to 
specify conditions under which fear appeals should be ineffective or counter-productive (e.g., the 
curvilinear model, the strong efficacy hypothesis, the stage model) and given the numerous 
practitioners who make bold claims stating that fear appeals are futile or even dangerous (e.g., 
Drug Free Action Alliance, 2013; Kok et al., 2014; Ruiter et al., 2014). Rather, fear appeals 
consistently work, and through the present meta-analysis I was able to identify various factors 
that can enhance their effectiveness to make them work even better. I believe that these results 
make important contributions to theory, practice, and policy. 
8.1 A Message-Behavior-Audience Framework of Fear Appeals 
 The present review was structured around a framework that considers three important 
aspects of any fear appeal communication: The message’s content, the recommended behavior, 
and the audience. This model is meant to be an organizing thread to help connect existing 
theories and research, and to identify areas in need of future research. I believe this framework is 
useful for several reasons. First, each aspect (message, behavior, and audience) has the potential 
to vary independently of the others and may impact the communication’s effectiveness in ways 
scholars must consider. Second, this structure connects and organizes seemingly unrelated 
theories and hypotheses concerning fear appeals, including the linear model, the stage model, 
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and hypotheses derived from prospect theory. Specifically, I found that fear appeals were more 
effective when the message depicted relatively high amounts of fear, included an efficacy 
message, and stressed susceptibility related to the concerns being addressed (i.e., factors 
concerning the message). I also found that fear appeals were more effective when they 
recommended one-time only behaviors, self-esteem enhancing behaviors while mentioning 
death, self-esteem hindering behaviors while not mentioning death, or moderately delayed 
behaviors while mentioning death (i.e., factors concerning the recommended behavior). Further, 
fear appeals were most effective when audiences included mostly women, members of 
collectivist cultures, or college-aged adults in the early stages of change (i.e., factors concerning 
the audience). 
 The MBA framework also highlights that prior research has strongly focused on one 
particular aspect of fear appeals somewhat to the exclusion of the other aspects. Specifically, the 
bulk of prior research on fear appeals has investigated questions about the message’s content – 
indeed, of the prior meta-analyses on fear appeals, all of them addressed questions related to the 
message’s content while overlooking questions related to the recommended behavior and 
audience. However, this bias is clearly not due to a lack of interesting or potentially important 
effects concerning the behavior or audience, as several clear effects emerged pertaining to each. 
Thus, I hope that the MBA framework will help generate interest in research directed toward 
these previously under-studied aspects of fear appeal effectiveness. 
8.2 Limitations 
 Three specific limitations are worth mentioning. First, as discussed in the introduction, 
the present results concern fear appeals rather than fear. That is, the present meta-analysis did not 
compare people who were subjectively afraid to people who were subjectively unafraid, but 
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rather it compared groups that were exposed to messages designed to depict more or less fear 
inducing content. Consequently, all comparisons between the treatment and comparison groups 
must be interpreted as effects of exposure to depicted levels of fear rather than effects of fear per 
se. However, this feature is not unique to the present analyses, and prior meta-analyses of fear 
appeals are subject to the same considerations (e.g., Boster & Mongeau, 1984; de Hoog et al., 
2007; Peters et al., 2012; Sutton, 1984; Witte & Allen, 2000). As researchers and practitioners 
alike are typically concerned with how to design effective communications, knowledge of the 
effectiveness of fear appeals is quite useful. 
 Relatedly, although the treatment groups were found to have experienced more subjective 
fear than the comparison groups, the majority of samples included no assessment of subjective 
fear (k = 177, which is 71% of samples in the database). This is a serious limitation of the 
existing literature for three reasons. First, if fear appeals are presumed to have an effect on 
outcomes by instilling fear in message recipients, it is important to verify that these messages 
actually evoke fear, and that it is the evoked fear that mediates the relation between message 
presentation and response. Indeed, many fear appeals may evoke emotions in addition to fear 
(e.g., disgust, anger), and these other emotions may partially (or in some cases fully) mediate the 
effects of fear appeals. Second, the lack of subjective fear measures makes it difficult (if not 
impossible) to equate fear appeal intensity across studies. What one research team refers to as 
low fear may represent what another research teams refers to as moderate fear or a control 
condition. However, the inclusion of subjective measures of fear in response to fear appeals 
would enable researchers to equate fear appeal intensity across studies and more precisely 
investigate effects via well-calibrated levels of fear. For example, this could be done by labeling 
fear conditions based on subjective fear ratings provided by participants in a standardized way – 
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e.g., if the average subjective fear rating was a “2” on a 1 (not frightened) to 5 (very frightened) 
scale, then the fear condition could be labeled as a 40% fear condition (2/5 = .40), whereas if the 
average subjective fear rating was “3,” the condition could be labeled as a 60% fear condition 
(3/5 = .60). Such labeling systems would help researchers equate fear conditions across studies 
and would also discourage misinterpretations of fear conditions simply based on the subjective 
labels given to conditions by researchers that may or may not actually reflect the amount of 
subjectively experienced fear (e.g., moderate-fear or low-fear are both terms that could 
reasonably describe a “40% fear” condition). Finally, the lack of subjective fear measures makes 
it difficult for researchers interested in the effects of fear (rather than fear appeals) to investigate 
relevant hypotheses meta-analytically. All three of these issues can be easily resolved by 
including measures of subjective fear in future studies on fear appeals, and I therefore urge 
researchers to do so. 
 The third limitation of note concerns the coding of variables in the current meta-analysis. 
Specifically, to test hypotheses related to terror management theory, studies were coded as either 
containing the word death or not. However, some studies did not include full texts for fear appeal 
messages, and thus it is possible that some messages did contain the word death but were 
nonetheless coded as not containing this word (however, studies were only coded as containing 
the word death if a portion of the message’s text was available that showed this word). Overall, it 
is likely that such miscodings would attenuate potential differences across conditions, although 
analyses including this variable found significant results nonetheless. 
8.3 Future Directions 
8.3.1 Experimental manipulations and mechanisms. The present meta-analysis only 
included experimental studies that compared treatment and comparison groups, and thus internal 
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validity is good when considering the effects of relatively high versus low depicted fear. 
However, meta-analyses are a correlational research design, and thus many of the moderator 
analyses I conducted should be interpreted with this in mind. For example, does using fear 
appeals to target one-time behaviors versus recurring behaviors actually cause the fear appeals to 
be more effective, or are fear appeals that target one-time behaviors systematically different from 
fear appeals that target recurring behaviors along some other dimension that results in the 
observed difference? Future experimental work will be necessary to address such questions, and 
I therefore encourage researchers to experimentally test the moderator findings concerning 
variables that were not manipulated in the primary studies. 
It is also important for future research to uncover the mechanisms behind the moderation 
effects I identified. For example, why are fear appeals more effective for one-time behaviors? A 
number of the hypotheses that I substantiated are relatively agnostic concerning mechanisms, 
and this is a serious gap in the current fear appeal literature. To truly understand fear appeal 
effectiveness, it is necessary to know why they work. This knowledge could then be used to 
design more effective fear appeals, and it could potentially be used for other types of 
communications as well. 
Relatedly, future research could benefit from developing methods to manipulate 
perceptions of certain variables that were found to be significant moderators. For example, fear 
appeals were more effective for one-time behaviors, but this knowledge is currently of little use 
to researchers or practitioners who address recurring behaviors. However, this knowledge could 
become useful if methods were developed to successfully re-frame recurring behaviors as one-
time behaviors. Such methods would also allow for experimental tests of the relevant dimensions 
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and mechanisms (e.g., test whether fear appeals can be made more effective for a particular 
behavior if the behavior is framed as one-time rather than recurring). 
 8.3.2 Linear effect of fear. Another important question to address in future research 
concerns the linear and curvilinear hypotheses tested in the present study. Strictly speaking, I did 
not find support for either model. High levels of depicted fear did not lead to different outcomes 
than moderate depicted fear, suggesting that high and moderate depictions of fear produce 
similar results. However, the reason for this is unclear – were the high fear messages 
unsuccessful at evoking more subjective fear than the moderate messages, or is there simply a 
point beyond which additional fear (depicted or subjective) confers no benefit? To explore these 
possibilities, future studies should examine a large range of depicted fear along with measures of 
subjectively experienced fear. 
 8.3.3 Attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. The results for attitude, intention, and 
behavior measures were generally consistent across studies, though occasionally the results 
diverged for certain moderators (see Appendix A for all results presented separately for attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviors). In such cases, it is difficult to interpret why such differences exist. 
First, different types of measures are often used for different outcomes. For example, behaviors 
were frequently measured using counts (“Number of times you did X”) or observational 
techniques (e.g., recording data from medical records; Ordoñana et al., 2009), intentions were 
frequently measured using agreement with dichotomous statements (e.g., “In the future, I intend 
to stop spending time outside strictly for the purpose of getting a tan,” with responses Yes and 
No; McMath & Prentice-Dunn, 2005, p.629) or Likert scales, and attitudes were frequently 
measures using semantic differential scales and Likert scales. Therefore, when results in the 
present meta-analysis differ as a function of attitude, intention, and behavior outcomes, these 
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differences may reflect substantive differences concerning the impact of fear appeals on different 
outcomes, or they may simply represent measurement variance across outcome measures and 
have nothing to do with substantive differences. 
Second, behaviors are often more difficult to accurately assess than attitudes or 
intentions, and thus researchers may be less likely to include behavioral measures when 
investigating certain types of hypotheses, such as new or risky hypotheses that have a lower 
probability of success. Similarly, it is possible that certain types of target behaviors are more 
likely to be tapped with certain types of measures – e.g., it may be more natural to assess 
attitudes toward recurring behaviors (“What is your attitudes toward getting the flu vaccine each 
year?”) rather than intentions (“Do you intend to get the flu vaccine each year for the rest of your 
life?”). Thus, differences across outcome types may also reflect differences in the types of 
behaviors or populations being targeted. Generally, when attitude, intention, and behavior results 
differed, there was no overall apparent pattern for these differences. Combined with the high 
correlations among measures, this indicates that differences across outcome types may be more 
likely to result from extraneous differences (e.g., measurement variance) rather than substantive 
differences, but this is a question that should still be explored in future research. Overall, it is still 
appropriate to combine these outcome types for the reasons discussed above in the methods 
section (i.e., they were highly correlated with each other, and they all represent outcomes of 
persuasion, which is the primary focus of the present analysis), and readers interested in 
differences among outcomes should consult Appendix A. 
 8.3.4 Integration of findings. Finally, I believe that an additional benefit of the MBA 
framework is its ability to guide researchers in generating future research questions. As 
mentioned, organizing the existing literature under this framework highlights the relative dearth 
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of research addressing the behavior and audience aspects of the model relative to the message 
aspect. A number of interesting questions have yet to be explored in these areas. For example, 
are fear appeals more effective if they address behaviors concerning the self or close others (e.g., 
one’s children, romantic partners), public or private behaviors (e.g., exercising at a gym versus 
alone), or socially desirable or undesirable behaviors? Further, are fear appeals differentially 
effective for target populations that differ in age, education, social class, or personality? Such 
questions have received relatively little attention, but they have the potential to inform fear 
appeal theory and practice. 
Additionally, what kinds of interactions exist when crossing aspects of message, 
behavior, and audience? I investigated two such questions in the present study with the 
hypotheses related to terror management theory – i.e., message content (presence versus absence 
of the word death) crossed with the recommended behavior (self-esteem enhancing versus 
hindering behaviors, immediate versus delayed outcomes). Both of these hypotheses were 
confirmed and yielded important insights into fear appeal effectiveness. This prompts the 
question of which other variables interact, particularly variables from separate aspects of the 
model. For example, might fear appeal effectiveness be moderated by interactions of culture (a 
factor of the audience) with the kind of behavior addressed by the fear appeal? Cross-cultural 
differences have rarely been explored in the effectiveness of fear appeals, and it is possible that 
cultural sensitivity to a behavior/issue may moderate the effectiveness of fear appeals addressing 
that behavior/issue. For example, East Asian countries have extremely low HIV prevalence rates 
and thus may be less susceptible to fear appeals on that topic relative to other topics. Whether 
this is true and whether it interacts with related findings (e.g., increased effectiveness of fear 
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appeals in collectivist samples) is an empirical question that could be fruitfully explored in future 
research. 
 Importantly, aspects other than message content, behavior, and audience may moderate 
the effectiveness of fear appeal communications. However, based on my review of the literature, 
there simply appeared to be too little research on other aspects to include them in the current 
framework. Two potential aspects worth noting are the source of the communication and the 
subjective experience of the message recipient. First, based on a well-established body of 
literature in persuasion demonstrating that aspects of a message’s source can influence the 
persuasiveness of the message (Briñol & Petty, 2009; Kumkale et al., 2010; Pornpitakpan, 2004; 
Wilson & Sherrell, 1993), the source of a fear appeal communication should be an important 
moderator for fear appeal effectiveness. For example, fear appeals from benevolent groups (e.g., 
a respected government institution, a close personal friend) may be more effective than fear 
appeals from self-interested groups (e.g., corporations or other for-profit entities). However, 
most empirical studies did not detail source information in a manner that allowed for a test of 
such hypotheses. Further, many fear appeals are delivered in the form of public service 
announcements, and thus there is relatively little variation across existing studies on this 
dimension. Second, drawing on the previous distinction between fear appeals and fear, the 
subjective experience of the message recipient should be an important aspect of fear appeal 
communications. Although most empirical studies simply do not measure participants’ 
subjective states, such measures could be very informative to test a variety of interesting 
questions. For example, is fear the only emotion evoked by fear appeals? If not, what other 
negative emotions are evoked (e.g., disgust, shame, guilt, anger), and are they partially 
responsible for the effectiveness of fear appeals? Similarly, perhaps the effects of fear appeals 
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are simply driven by induced negative affect or high arousal, and the specific experience of fear 
is superfluous? Future research using measures of subjective experience are needed to address 
these questions. The paucity of existing research addressing source characteristics and subjective 
experience led me to not include these as aspects of the current review framework, but they 
would be welcome additions in the future.  
 It is worth noting that the MBA model is intended as an organizing framework to connect 
existing theories of fear appeals, rather than as a novel theory of fear appeals. Although the 
present research was not concerned with developing a grand, over-arching theory of fear appeal 
effectiveness, some researchers may be interested in creating such a theory, and this framework 
presents a solid foundation upon which researchers could pursue that goal. Specifically, when 
looking across results from the message, behavior, and audience aspects of the model, it may be 
possible to identify common themes that could be leveraged to form an over-arching theory. As 
one example, most of the significant effects can be construed as relevant to goal adoption and 
pursuit. For example, the amount of depicted fear, the amount of depicted severity and 
susceptibility, and the presence of the word death (in certain conditions) are all factors that can 
enhance the perceived importance of adopting the fear appeal’s recommendation as a goal 
because they highlight the importance of doing so. Further, the presence of efficacy statements 
and the focus on one-time (versus repeated behaviors) are both factors that may enhance the 
perceived ease with which the fear appeal’s recommendation could be pursued, thus making 
people feel as though the goal is more attainable and thus worthy of attention. Additionally, by 
targeting particular audiences, fear appeal recommendations may spontaneously be perceived as 
relevant to chronic goals for groups who are chronically avoidance-focused (women and 
members of collectivist cultures) or they may highlight why a particular goal is important for 
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groups who have not considered the goal before (young adults in the early stages of change). 
This is just one example of how the results of the present meta-analysis could be used to help 
future researchers identify common, cross-cutting themes that could then be used to build an 
over-arching theory of fear appeal effectiveness 
8.4 Conclusion 
 To conclude, fear appeals are effective, and the present synthesis organized and identified 
factors that make them even more effective. Specifically, fear appeals are particularly effective 
when the communication depicts relatively high amounts of fear, includes an efficacy message, 
and stresses severity and susceptibility related to the concerns being addressed. Fear appeals are 
also more effective when they recommend one-time only behaviors, self-esteem enhancing 
behaviors while mentioning death, self-esteem hindering behaviors while not mentioning death, 
or delayed behaviors while mentioning death. Finally, fear appeals are also more effective when 
the audience is comprised of mostly women, members of collectivist cultures, or college-aged 
adults in the early stages of change. I formed these conclusions by meta-analytically testing a 
wide variety of influential fear appeal theories using the largest and most comprehensive fear 
appeals database to date. I believe this analysis has provided a thorough overview of the state of 
the literature and also generated a variety of important and exciting future directions.  
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Table 3. Effect sizes and sample sizes for each sample included in the linear versus curvilinear test. 
   d 
FirstAuthor NH NM 
Combined 
Outcomes Attitudes Intentions Behaviors 
Beck & Davis, 1978       
     1: Low Interest 14 15 .28 .28 - - 
     2: High Interest 14 16 -.45 -.45 - - 
Burnett, 1981 36 43 .51 .73 .28 - 
Chu, 1966       
     1: Low Efficacy 100 125 1.06 - - 1.06 
     2: Medium Efficacy 112 121 -.18 - - -.18 
     3: High Efficacy 120 112 .36 - - .36 
Hill & Gardner, 1980       
     1: Repressors 11 13 -.07 - - -.07 
     2: Sensitizers 15 14 .65 - - .65 
Leventhal et al., 1965       
     1: No Prior Vaccination 22 34 .09 - - .09 
     2: Prior Vaccination 29 30 -2.58 - - -2.58 
Ramirez & Lasater, 1976 231 231 .00 - - .00 
Schoenbachler & Whittler, 1996 125 123 .00 .00 .00 - 
Skilbeck et al., 1977       
     1: Single Exposure 25 18 .58 - - .58 
     2: Multiple Exposures 17 18 -.43 - - -.43 
Smart & Fejer, 1974       
     1: Marijuana, Non-Users 122 119 -.26 - -.26 - 
     2: Marijuana, Users 414 441 -.03 - -.03 - 
Yoon & Tinkman, 2013       
     1: Low Past Threat, Nonhumor Ads 24 24 -.13 -.23 -.04 - 
     2: Low Past Threat, Humor Ads 24 24 .30 .41 .19 - 
     3: High Past Threat, Nonhumor Ads 24 24 .19 .11 .26 - 
     4: High Past Threat, Humor Ads 24 24 -.48 -.64 -.32 - 
Thornton et al., 2000 56 57 -.72 - -.72 - 
Note: d = Standardized mean effect size. NH = Sample size for the high depicted fear group. NM = Sample size for 
the medium depicted fear group. Combined outcomes = Average of all attitude, intention, and behavior measures. 
Dash (–) indicates the variable was not relevant for the study. The attitude, intention, and behavior measures are 
analyzed separately in Appendix A. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the sample. 
Variable Grouping Relevant Descriptive Statistics 
  M Md SD k 
Publication year By sample 1993 1998 16 248 
 By paper 1992 1994 16 127 
  Journal Article Dissertation/Thesis 
Conference 
Proceeding k 
Source type By sample 91% (226) 8% (21) < 1% (1) 248 
 By paper 91% (116) 8% (10) < 1% (1) 127 
  Laboratory Field  k 
Setting By sample 56% (137) 44% (107)  244 
 By paper 53% (67) 47% (59)  126 
  
Disease 
Prevention Smoking HIV/AIDS/STDs  
Domain By sample 21% (51) 16% (40) 13% (33)  
  Driving Safety Cancer Prevention Drinking/Drugs 
 
 
 By sample 11% (27) 10% (26) 8% (20)  
  
Dental 
Hygiene Environment/Society General Safety 
 
 
 By sample 6% (14) 5% (13) 5% (13)  
  Other   
 
k 
 By sample 4% (11)   248 
Note: M = Mean. Md = Median. SD = Standard deviation. k = Number of samples or papers, as specified. For 
several variables, descriptive statistics were calculated analyzing each paper as a unit (“By paper”) and each 
independent sample within the paper as a unit (“By sample”). Some variables were only appropriate to analyze by 
sample (e.g., percent of studies that researched smoking behavior). 
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Figure 1. Forest plot of the effect sizes. 
 
Note: This forest plot includes point estimates and confidence intervals for all studies in the 
manuscript. The solid vertical line represents the combined effect size from the fixed-effects 
analysis (d = .27). 
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Figure 2. Funnel plot of effect sizes. 
 
Note: Effect size (d) is plotted on the x-axis and standard error on the y-axis. The solid vertical 
line represents the combined effect size from the fixed-effects analysis (d = .27). The dotted line 
represents the x-intercept (x = 0) for a reference line. The white region represents the inside of 
the 95% pseudo confidence interval, whereas the shaded region represents the outside (i.e., the 
area of statistical significance). 
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Figure 3. Normal quantile plot. 
 
 
Note: The dashed lines represents a 95% confidence band. The line on the diagonal indicates 
normality. 
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APPENDIX A: FIXED-EFFECTS ANALYSES FOR INDIVIDUAL OUTCOMES 
In the body of the manuscript, I presented fixed-effects analyses for a combined measure 
averaging across attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. Here, I present the analyses done separately 
for each type of measure. 
First, the overall average effect size comparing treatment to comparison groups 
separately for attitudes, intentions, and behaviors was respectively d = 0.20 (95% CI: [0.16, 
0.24], k = 110), d = 0.28 (95% CI: [0.25, 0.31], k = 163), and d = 0.35 (95% CI: [0.32, 0.39], k = 
70). 
To examine the linear and curvilinear hypotheses for each outcome, I computed the 
average weighted effect size comparing outcomes for high fear versus moderate fear groups. For 
attitudes, intentions, and behaviors, the results were respectively d = 0.06 (95% CI: [-0.11, 0.22], 
k = 8), d = -0.08 (95% CI: [-0.17, 0.02], k = 9), and d = 0.15 (95% CI: [0.04, 0.25], k = 10). 
To examine the gender hypothesis, I regressed outcomes onto the percent of the sample 
that was female. The results for attitudes, intentions, and behaviors were respectively b = 0.0039 
(SE = 0.0010, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0020, 0.0057], p < .001, k = 72), b = 0.0033 (SE = 
0.0007, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0018, 0.0047], p < .001, k = 119), and b = -0.0009 (SE = 
0.0012, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0034, 0.0015], p = .45, k = 49). 
To examine the education hypothesis, I regressed outcomes onto the percent of the 
sample that had attained a high school degree or higher. The results for attitudes, intentions, and 
behaviors were respectively b = 0.0013 (SE = 0.0005, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0003, 0.0024], p 
= .01, k = 86), b = 0.0030 (SE = 0.0004, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0022, 0.0038], p < .0001, k = 
140), and b = -0.0019 (SE = 0.0005, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0029, -0.0009], p = .0001, k = 46). 
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To examine the race hypotheses, I regressed outcomes onto the percent of the sample that 
was African, Asian, European, and Hispanic/Latino(a) for each of the potential outcomes. The 
results for attitudes were respectively b = 0.0049 (SE = 0.0011, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0027, 
0.0071], p < .0001, k = 31), b = -0.0017 (SE = 0.0008, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0033, -0.0000], 
p = .046, k = 31), b = -0.0015 (SE = 0.0008, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0031, 0.0001], p = .06, k = 
32), and b = 0.0571 (SE = 0.0116, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0343, 0.0799], p < .0001 , k = 31). 
The results for intentions were respectively b = -0.0041 (SE = 0.0013, 95% CI for the slope: [-
0.0066, -0.0017], p = .001, k = 62), b = 0.0017 (SE = 0.0006, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0006, 
0.0028], p = .003, k = 62), b = -0.0010 (SE = 0.0006, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0021, 0.0001], p 
= .09, k = 67), and b = 0.0005 (SE = 0.0077, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0147, 0.0156], p = .95, k = 
62). The results for behaviors were respectively b = -0.0047 (SE = 0.0010, 95% CI for the slope: 
[-0.0067, -0.0027], p < .0001 , k = 35), b = -0.0012 (SE = 0.0008, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0026, 
0.0003], p = .13, k = 34), b = 0.0048 (SE = 0.0007, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0034, 0.0063], p < 
.0001 , k = 35), and b = -0.0032 (SE = 0.0023, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0078, 0.0014], p = .17, k 
= 34). 
The results for all categorical moderator analyses are presented in Table A.1. 
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APPENDIX B: RANDOM-EFFECTS ANALYSES 
In the body of the manuscript, I presented fixed-effects analyses. I present the 
corresponding random-effects analyses here. 
First, the average weighted effect size comparing treatment to comparison groups for 
combined outcomes, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors was respectively d = 0.29 (95% CI: 
[0.22, 0.35]), d = 0.23 (95% CI: [0.11, 0.34]), d = 0.31 (95% CI: [0.24, 0.38]), and d = 0.27 (95% 
CI: [0.13, 0.42]). The heterogeneity statistics for each measure were respectively Q(247) = 1,287 
(I2 = 85.11, p < .0001), Q(109) = 614 (I2 = 86.52, p < .0001), Q(162) = 615 (I2 = 75.48, p < 
.0001), and Q(69) = 733 (I2 = 92.37, p < .0001). 
Based on the 71 samples that included subjective fear measures, fear appeals were 
generally successful at inducing experienced fear, such that treatment groups reported more fear 
than comparison groups, d = 1.00 (95% CI: [0.83, 1.18]), Q(70) = 697, I2 = 90.67, p < .0001. 
To examine the linear and curvilinear hypotheses for each outcome, I computed the 
average weighted effect size comparing outcomes for high fear versus moderate fear groups. For 
combined outcomes, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors, the results were respectively d = -0.05 
(95% CI: [-0.34, 0.24]), d = 0.05 (95% CI: [-0.27, 0.36]), d = -0.09 (95% CI: [-0.29, 0.11]), and d 
= -0.04 (95% CI: [-0.63, 0.56]). The heterogeneity statistics for each measure were respectively 
Q(20) = 154 (I2 = 92.89, p < .0001), Q(7) = 19 (I2 = 66.10, p = .009), Q(8) = 19 (I2 = 65.95, p = 
.01), and Q(9) = 118 (I2 = 96.12, p < .0001). 
To examine the gender hypothesis, I regressed outcomes onto the percent of the sample 
that was female. The results for combined outcomes, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors were 
respectively b = 0.0031 (SE = 0.0012, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0007, 0.0055], p = .01, k = 168), 
b = 0.0019 (SE = 0.0022, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0024, 0.0061], p = .38, k = 72), b = 0.0043 
108 
(SE = 0.0013, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0016, 0.0069], p = .002, k = 119), and b = 0.0037 (SE = 
0.0028, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0018, 0.0091], p = .19, k = 49). 
To examine the education hypothesis, I regressed outcomes onto the percent of the 
sample that had attained a high school degree or higher. The results for combined outcomes, 
attitudes, intentions, and behaviors were respectively b = 0.0011 (SE = 0.0010, 95% CI for the 
slope: [-0.0010, 0.0031], p = .30, k = 192), b = 0.0004 (SE = 0.0020, 95% CI for the slope: [-
0.0034, 0.0042], p = .84, k = 86), b = 0.0024 (SE = 0.0011, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0003, 
0.0046], p = .03, k = 140), and b = -0.0001 (SE = 0.0018, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0037, 
0.0035], p = .95, k = 46). 
To examine the race hypotheses, I regressed outcomes onto the percent of the sample that 
was African, Asian, European, and Hispanic/Latino(a) for each of the potential outcomes. The 
results for combined outcomes were respectively b = 0.0012 (SE = 0.0022, 95% CI for the slope: 
[-0.0031, 0.0055], p = .58, k = 85), b = 0.0026 (SE = 0.0013, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0001, 
0.0051], p = .04, k = 84), b = -0.0026 (SE = 0.0012, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0050, -0.0002], p = 
.04, k = 89), and b = 0.0004 (SE = 0.0045, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0085, 0.0093], p = .93, k = 
84). The results for attitudes were respectively b = 0.0021 (SE = 0.0037, 95% CI for the slope: [-
0.0052, 0.0095], p = .57, k = 31), b = -0.0014 (SE = 0.0029, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0071, 
0.0044], p = .64, k = 31), b = -0.0003 (SE = 0.0029, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0060, 0.0054], p = 
.92, k = 32), and b = 0.0697 (SE = 0.0353, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0006, 0.1388], p = .048, k = 
31). The results for intentions were respectively b = -0.0048 (SE = 0.0027, 95% CI for the slope: 
[-0.0101, 0.0005], p = .08, k = 62), b = 0.0038 (SE = 0.0012, 95% CI for the slope: [0.0015, 
0.0061], p = .001, k = 62), b = -0.0030 (SE = 0.0012, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0053, -0.0006], p 
= .01, k = 67), and b = -0.0255 (SE = 0.0191, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0630, 0.0119], p = .18 , k 
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= 62). The results for behaviors were respectively b = -0.0005 (SE = 0.0028, 95% CI for the 
slope: [-0.0060, 0.0051], p = 87, k = 35), b = 0.0032 (SE = 0.0021, 95% CI for the slope: [-
0.0009, 0.0073], p = .13, k = 34), b = -0.0014 (SE = 0.0021, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0055, 
0.0027], p = .51, k = 35), and b = 0.0008 (SE = 0.0048, 95% CI for the slope: [-0.0086, 0.0101], 
p = .87, k = 34). 
The results for all categorical moderator analyses are presented in Table B.1. 
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